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ABSTRACT  
Most citizens correctly forecast which party will win in most elections, usually 
with greater accuracy than voter intention polls. How do they do it? We argue 
that social networks are a big part of the answer: much of what we know as 
citizens comes from our communication with others. Previous research has 
considered only indirect characteristics of social networks to analyze why 
citizens are good forecasters. Using a unique German survey, we consider 
direct measures of social networks to explore their role in election forecasting. 
We find that three network characteristics – size, political composition, and 
frequency of political discussion – are among the most important variables 
when predicting the accuracy of citizens’ election forecasts.  
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Social Networks and Citizen Election Forecasting:  
The More Friends the Better 
 
 
In most elections, the majority of citizens are able to correctly predict the 
election winner, regardless of who they plan to vote for (Lewis-Beck and 
Skalaban 1989; Lewis-Beck and Tien 1999; Miller et al. 2012; Murr 2011, 2015, 
2016).  Most US citizens typically predict not only which presidential candidate 
will win their state, but also who will win the presidency (e.g., Graefe 2014); 
most British citizens are usually correct about which party will win their 
constituency and which will garner a parliamentary majority (e.g., Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier 2011; Murr 2016).  How do they do it? 
A small body of work suggests that social networks are a big part of the 
answer. Much of what we know as citizens comes from our social networks 
(e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and so we base our election prediction – 
like so many of our beliefs – on information from people in our network (Uhlaner 
and Grofman 1986; Lewis-Beck and Tien 1999; Meffert et al. 2011).  However, 
previous studies on social networks and citizen forecasting accuracy have been 
hampered by the lack of direct measures of social network characteristics, and 
instead relied on indirect or proxy measures. For example, Lewis-Beck and 
Tien (1999) find that people with higher levels of education are better able to 
predict who will win. This is likely because people with higher education levels 
have developed skills to acquire and process information. They also intimate 
that level of education tells us something about the size of a person’s network, 
with more educated individuals possessing a larger network. Uhlaner and 
Grofman (1986) and Meffert et al. (2011) use electoral differences between the 
citizen’s electoral district and the national level to indirectly capture the 
network’s partisan composition, because the surveys they use do not collect 
measures of social network party leanings. Yet these indirect measures may 
miss important aspects of the role of social networks on citizen forecasting.   
In this study, we use direct measures of network size and composition, 
along with other network characteristics, in order to build a more complete 
model of citizen forecasting. Using a unique cross-sectional survey that 
collected both citizen election forecasts and direct measures of several social 
network characteristics in Germany in the autumn of 1990, we demonstrate that 
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social networks are as predictive of citizen forecasting accuracy as the most 
important predictors identified by previous research: vote intention and political 
interest.  In addition, we show which social network characteristics have 
predictive power – size, political composition, and frequency of discussion – 
and which ones do not – heterogeneity and level of expertise – in influencing 
election forecasts.  We additionally provide guidance for future surveys on what 
network measure to include for improving the accuracy of citizen election 
forecasts.  Using a cross-validation exercise we demonstrate that a single, 
abbreviated measure of network size improves out-of-sample predictions.  
 
WHY CITIZEN FORECASTS? 
 
As the field of election forecasting has grown, scholars have experimented with 
different measures and methods to find the most accurate predictors (for 
reviews, see Stegmaier and Norpoth 2017; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2014). 
Often, such models include vote intention or government approval ratings a few 
months prior to the election as a gauge of the electorate’s preferences.1  Such 
variables are found in models of elections in the US (Campbell 2016; Erikson 
and Wlezien 2016), Britain (Ford et al. 2016; Stegmaier and Williams 2016) and 
Germany (Norpoth and Gschwend 2017; Jérôme et al. 2017) among others. 
Both the approval and vote intention items reflect the respondent’s personal 
assessment of the incumbent government or the candidates.  However, a 
developing branch of the election forecasting literature has begun to utilize 
electoral expectations measured by the question “who do you think will win the 
election?”  This approach is referred to as “citizen forecasting” and has been 
used for election prediction in the US (Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1989; Lewis-
Beck and Tien 1999; Graefe 2014; Murr 2015) and Britain (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2011, Murr 2011, 2016). 
 In the citizen forecasting models, survey responses are aggregated to 
the level of prediction – at the national or constituency level. And most often, 
citizens get it right.  For instance, in their pioneering study, Lewis-Beck and 
                                                 
1 In addition to voting intention polls or approval ratings, such models often include economic 
performance measures, number of terms the party has held office, and previous election results. 
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Skalaban (1989) looked at citizen forecasts of eight US presidential elections 
between 1956 and 1984.  They found that on average 69 percent of citizens 
correctly forecast the election winner, and that the majority of citizens correctly 
forecasted 75 percent (6 of 8) of the elections.  In other words, moving from 
individual to aggregate forecasts improved the accuracy from 69 to 75 percent 
– an increase of 6 percentage points.  Their two main findings – that most 
citizens correctly forecast most of the time, and that groups forecast better than 
individuals – have subsequently been replicated at different levels (subnational 
and national) and in different countries (Britain and United States) (e.g., Graefe 
2014, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2011; Murr 2011, 2015, 2016). 
 In addition to demonstrating that citizen forecasts are accurate, several 
studies have shown that citizen forecasts are more accurate than any other 
forecasting approach, including voter intention polls. Using national-level data 
from the last 100 days before the seven US presidential elections between 1988 
and 2012, Graefe (2014) compared the relative accuracy of citizen forecasts, 
voter intentions, prediction markets, expert surveys, and quantitative models. 
He found that citizen forecasts are better than any other approach at forecasting 
both election winners and vote shares. Similarly, using national-level data from 
the 48 months before 18 British general elections between 1950 and 2015, Murr 
et al. (2016) compared the relative accuracy of citizen forecasts and voter 
intentions. They found that citizen forecasts are better than voter intentions at 
forecasting both the winning party and its seat share. 
As Murr (2015) has shown, the accuracy of citizen forecasts can even 
be increased by optimally weighting and delegating the individual forecasts 
based on the citizens’ competence (e.g., Grofman 1975; Kazmann 1973; 
Shapley and Grofman 1984).  The method proceeds in two steps: first, predict 
the probability that a citizen will correctly forecast; then, delegate the 
forecasting to the most competent citizen and weight their forecasts by their 
level of competence.  Using data from eleven US presidential elections 
between 1952 and 2012, Murr (2015) showed that doing so increases the 
forecasting accuracy of both the candidates’ vote shares in states and of which 
candidate will carry the state.  Therefore, being able to predict the chance that 
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a citizen will correctly forecast the election is crucial for improving forecasting 
accuracy. 
 
WHY CAN CITIZENS FORECAST CORRECTLY? 
 
The explanation of why citizen forecasts are accurate has two parts 
(Murr 2017). The first part explains why groups forecast better than individuals. 
This explanation rests on the assumption that individuals forecast better than 
chance on average, and the second part of the explanation rests on why 
individuals are able to do so. 
 Murr (2011) explains the fact that groups predict better than individuals 
with Condorcet’s jury theorem and its generalizations (Condorcet 1785). 
Condorcet proves under which conditions group decisions reached by plurality 
rule are better, equal, or worse than individual decisions. His proof assumes 
that the group faces one correct and one incorrect alternative, that the k group 
members vote independently of one another, and that each member has one 
vote and the same probability p of choosing the correct alternative.  Then the 
probability of a correct group decision by majority vote is 
𝑃 = ∑ (
𝑘
𝑚
)𝑝𝑚(1 − 𝑝)𝑘−𝑚
𝑘
𝑚=⌊𝑘/2⌋+1
. 
He shows that if each member chooses the correct alternative with more than 
50 percent probability, then as the group size increases to infinity, the 
probability of a correct group decision approaches unity (“wisdom of crowds”). 
He also shows that if each member chooses the correct alternative with less 
than 50 percent probability, then as the group size increases to infinity, the 
probability of a correct group decision approaches zero (“folly of crowds”). 
Although Condorcet’s jury theorem refers to group sizes approaching 
infinity, even small groups show the effect of aggregating individual choices.  
Consider a group of three independent members each with a probability of 
choosing the correct alternative of 0.6.  This group chooses the correct 
alternative using majority vote if at least two out of three members vote 
correctly. Using the above formula, the probability of a correct group decision 
is 𝑃 = 3 × 0.62 × 0.4 + 0.63 = 0.648, an increase in accuracy of about 5 
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percentage points.  This probability increases as the group size increases: with 
five independent members this probability is 0.6824, with seven it is 0.7102, 
with nine it is 0.7334, and so on.  In other words, even though individually 
members may only be slightly better than chance in getting it right, collectively 
they may choose the correct alternative with almost certainty, if the group has 
enough members. Table 1 displays the probabilities of a correct group decision 
for different individual probabilities of getting it right (p = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9) 
as well as different group sizes (k = 3, 5, 7, and 9). 
 
Table 1. The probability of a correct majority vote of k members with 
individual probability of getting it right p. 
 k = 3 k = 5 k = 7 k = 9 
p = 0.6 0.6480 0.6826 0.7102 0.7334 
p = 0.7 0.7840 0.8369 0.8740 0.9012 
p = 0.8 0.8960 0.9421 0.9667 0.9804 
p = 0.9 0.9720 0.9914 0.9973 0.9991 
 
In deriving the theorem, Condorcet made three assumptions: each 
member chooses between only two alternatives, votes independently of the 
others, and has the same probability of voting correctly.  Since the publication 
of his theorem, several other authors have relaxed each of these assumptions 
and generalized the theorem accordingly. The theorem still holds even with 
more than two alternatives (List and Goodin 2001).  This is important because 
in many elections voters choose between more than two parties.  Further, 
Ladha (1992) generalizes the theorem to correlated votes.  This is important 
because citizens might share the same information, talk to each other, or tend 
to “groupthink” (e.g., Janis 1982).  Finally, Grofman et al. (1983) prove that the 
theorem still holds if members differ in their chance of getting it right as long as 
they are better than chance on average.  This is important because Lewis-Beck 
and Skalaban (1989) show that citizens differ in their probability of making a 
correct forecast.  In sum, these generalizations make the theorem useful for 
explaining why groups of citizens predict better than individuals. 
 Because the explanation of why groups predict better than individuals 
rests on the fact that individuals predict better than chance on average, the next 
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step is to explain why they should do so. Murr (2017) explains the fact that 
individuals predict better than chance with Uhlaner and Grofman’s Contact 
Model (Uhlaner and Grofman 1986). Echoing Condorcet’s jury theorem, the 
Contact Model proves under which conditions a citizen’s forecast, reached by 
choosing the party supported by the plurality of information available to the 
citizen, is better or equal or worse than chance. The proof assumes that the 
citizen forecasts a two-party election, that she receives and accepts information 
from the environment independently of one another, and that she counts each 
piece of information equally. 
The Contact Model implies that if a citizen receives and accepts only 
information consistent with her vote intention (“selective sampling”), then citizen 
forecasts will always be better than chance on average, though always as 
informative as voter intentions. However, if a citizen receives and accepts 
information representative of the public’s voter intentions (“random sampling”), 
then citizens will always be better than both chance and voter intentions on 
average. As the number of randomly sampled bits of information increases to 
infinity, the probability of a correct forecast approaches unity.  In other words, 
as soon as citizens receive and accept at least some information that is 
representative of the public’s vote intention, they will do better than chance and 
voter intentions, which indeed they do (e.g., Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1989; 
Graefe 2014). 
Because much of what we know as citizens comes from interpersonal 
communication, we argue that citizens’ social networks predict their election 
forecast. And that the network offers the representative information necessary 
to forecast better than chance. 
 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CITIZEN FORECASTS 
 
 The study of social networks—the social context through which 
individuals are tied to others—has shed light on how and to what extent friends, 
family, neighbors, and peers influence both electoral belief formation and voting 
behavior.  Along with learning from previous cohorts and personal experience 
(Manski 2004, Blais and Bodet 2006) and the media (Entman 1989), networks 
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provide contextual information to allow voters to form expectations about 
elections and influence their choices.  Meffert et al. (2011), for example, analyze 
various factors that influence electoral expectations, such as political 
motivations (knowledge and interest), rational and strategic considerations 
(perceived distance between parties), and social context (regional differences 
as proxy of personal networks) and how these expectations influence voting 
behavior.  The authors find that voters can form reasonable expectations about 
the winning party and that these beliefs are used to cast “fairly sophisticated 
votes”, such as strategic coalition voting.   
Complementarily, Pattie and Johnston (1999) have shown that 
conversations with partisan discussants influence vote decisions and these can 
even lead citizens to switch their vote to another party.  Similarly, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1991) show that vote preferences are not only determined by the 
voter characteristics, but also by their discussant partners’ characteristics and 
political preferences. And Nickerson (2008) provides evidence about the 
influence of couples on voting behavior. Other studies have shown that 
variations in the composition and size of an individual’s network affect political 
attitudes and the amount of political information. These in turn affect their 
behavior and their beliefs (Huckfeldt 2007; Mutz 1998; Huckfeldt and Mendez 
2008; Partheymüller and Schmitt-Beck 2012; Pietryka 2015).  
  But how do people form electoral expectations? Citizens may gather 
information and update their beliefs about electoral victories based on: 1) their 
network members’ characteristics, through observing how their members 
behave and think about political, social and economic matters, 2) direct 
information from their network by discussing who they think will win the election 
and which party they support, 3) previous electoral experiences, and 4) the 
news and opinion polls.  
 The nature of social networks makes this source of information more 
likely to influence citizen electoral expectations and behavior than other 
sources such as the news media or polls. For instance, Schmitt-Beck and 
Mackenrodt (2010) show that personal communication appears more influential 
than mass communication on turnout in a German local election. Despite that 
the media and polls may provide more reliable and balanced information about 
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the electoral environment than social networks, information from social 
networks may provide more personalized information by using language and 
terms that are more familiar and closer to the local context.  
While obtaining information from the news media and polls is a passive 
source of information, social networks give citizens the chance to actively 
disagree with dissonant information and to learn from it by debating with 
network members. Hence, all sources of information might be complementary, 
but social networks provide the citizen the opportunity to engage in back-and-
forth debate and to learn from disagreement. As suggested by McClurg (2006), 
social networks can encourage higher levels of political involvement, as well as 
increased openness toward differing viewpoints.  In other words, people can 
learn from their networks. 
The magnitude of the network’s influence on citizens’ beliefs about who 
will win the election may depend on the network’s size, frequency of political 
discussion, political expertise and composition (heterogeneity), along with 
additional sources of political information.2 Citizens embedded in larger social 
networks may have an advantage in forecasting elections, as they frequently 
have higher levels of political knowledge (Kwak et al. 2005). In addition, the 
larger the social network, the more likely it is that the network will reflect the 
vote intentions of the population, making the aforementioned indirect inference 
more accurate (Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004)3.  
 Citizens without a network (isolated citizens) may form their beliefs 
about who will win the election based on media or poll information, as well as 
on their own electoral preferences. Yet when these citizens incorrectly perceive 
who will win the election, they lack the social contextual pressure or ability to 
update their expectations. In contrast, citizens embedded in networks with 
initially wrong or uncertain beliefs may retrieve information from their network 
and revise their expectations using information about their network’s voting 
preferences (Chandra 2009).    
                                                 
2 Similarly, Millner and Ollivier (2016) discuss three main factors that determine the public’s beliefs in 
the context of environmental policies: individual inference (how updating of beliefs takes place), 
social learning and media. 
3 This is true only if the most important agent’s influence diminishes as the number of network 
members increases (Golub and Jackson 2010). 
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Having large networks may influence beliefs and behavior, but the 
information citizens obtain from them should be frequently updated. The more 
political discussions citizens have with their network, the more information they 
collect from its members and the more they are able to remember it. Additional 
information may also make the network’s information more salient than the 
citizen’s own information when this brings new information to the citizen. 
Moreover, the increased frequency of discussion encourages citizens to 
become more informed and, therefore, it improves their ability to forecast 
(Eveland 2004; Eveland and Hively 2009). 
 Both informed and uninformed citizens use networks to gather 
information about the political system and elections (Pietryka 2015).  They seek 
out political experts, even if they do not share the same partisan affiliation, to 
help evaluate an election. Citizens are more likely to be influenced by those 
they perceive as having expertise (Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008, Ryan 2011 and 
Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2014; Huckfeldt, Pietryka, and Reilly 2014) than by 
non-experts.  Thus, these experts within the network should help improve 
citizens’ accuracy in forecasting by providing accurate, if still biased, 
information. Political expertise can also help to recognize dissonant information 
and reject it (McClurg 2006). 
In general, social networks play a role in both disseminating information 
and acquiring information that reduces ambiguity (Manski 2004; Ahn, Huckfeldt, 
and Ryan 2014; Eveland and Hively 2009; Finkel and Smith 2011).  However, 
in some cases, information acquired from social networks may decrease the 
likelihood of a correct election prediction.  When the political network leans 
toward the losing parties, or when the citizen is unsure of how network 
members will vote, this will undermine the citizen’s ability to offer an accurate 
election prediction. Those embedded in homogeneous networks may assume 
greater support for a political party than in fact exists. Homogeneous networks 
may also reinforce “wishful thinking” and therefore, citizens belonging to these 
networks may overestimate the chances of victory of a party that presents little 
chance of success.   
   While political disagreement in networks persists even in multiparty 
electorates (Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005; Huckfeldt and Johnson 2004), 
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individuals frequently find themselves in social networks with like-minded 
others. Homogeneity (homophily) of the network may increase or decrease the 
likelihood of a successful forecast.  Individuals in heterogeneous networks tend 
to show higher levels of political knowledge, as they frequently seek out 
additional information when they interact with those who do not share their 
views, which should improve an electoral forecast (Eveland and Hively 2009).  
However, to the extent that individuals rely on their networks to act as 
representative samples, more homogenous networks, particularly those allied 
with an unlikely winner, will decrease the likelihood of a correct forecast.  Thus, 
in such case, the inclusion of more people into a person’s network will not add 
new information. As such, social networks may improve the ability of citizens to 
make accurate electoral forecasts, but it is dependent on the size and 
composition of these networks. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
 
The 1990 German federal election offers a unique electoral context to 
examine how social networks predict citizens’ ability to forecast the election, as 
it provides a direct comparison between citizens with long-term democratic 
experience (West Germans) and citizens new to democratic elections (East 
Germans), without varying the institutional or electoral context.  West Germany 
held its first democratic election on 14 August 1949, whereas East Germany 
held its first democratic election on 18 March 1990.  The December 2, 1990 
Bundestag federal election was the first Federal Republic of Germany election 
for East Germans, who had voted only four months earlier to unify with West 
Germany. 
After its electoral victory in January 1987, the governing Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) had been losing support (Figure 1). This loss 
benefited the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which 
then led the polls from October 1987 to September 1989.  However, the CDU 
started to recover midway through the electoral cycle and led for the first time 
again in October 1989, starting a period of uncertainty about whether the CDU 
or the SPD would win in the subsequent election. From March 1990 onward, it 
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looked increasingly likely that the CDU would be victorious in December. They 
won the East German general election in March, leading the SPD by 19 
percentage points.  In April Oskar Lafontaine, the candidate of the SPD, fell 
victim to an assassination attempt and was unable to campaign for three 
months.  From August onwards, opinion polls showed the CDU in the lead, in 
large part due to the public perception that the CDU was the party best able to 
handle the economic consequences of unification (Pulzer 1991). However, 
even though the outcome was fairly certain, as we discuss in the next section, 
not everyone correctly forecasted a CDU win. 
 
Figure 1: Voting intentions, 1987–1990. 
 
Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2017). 
 
To examine how social networks predict the ability of citizens to forecast, 
we use the 1990 German section of the Comparative National Elections 
Project, a cross-national survey that collects both traditional individual-level 
data, as well as information on the respondents’ media, organizational, and, 
most importantly for this project, social network characteristics (Gunther et al. 
2015; Gunther, Puhle, and Montero 2007). The German section of this survey 
relies on face-to-face interviews in the pre-election period (October and 
November 1990) and includes a network battery that asked respondents to 
name up to five people with whom they discuss important matters.  Our sample 
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includes a total of 1547 respondents, 487 of whom are from East Germany.  
This survey, to our knowledge, uniquely provides both information on the 
extensiveness and character of respondent’s social networks and the 
respondent’s electoral forecast.         
 To measure the ability of citizens to correctly forecast the winner of the 
election, we rely on a survey item that asks respondents whether they believe 
that a CDU-led government or an SPD-led government was likely to win the 
election, or if they did not know4.  Based on previous literature, we code all 
respondents who predict a CDU victory as correct forecasters, and all other 
respondents as incorrect. The majority of respondents correctly forecasted the 
winner; however, approximately 25% of West Germans and 18% of East 
Germans had incorrect forecasts about the election. It is notable, here, that 
despite their limited experience with democratic elections, the East Germans 
were better forecasters than the West Germans. 
To differentiate between uncertain and inaccurate answers, we create a 
categorical variable, where those who answer SPD are treated as inaccurate, 
those who respond with ‘don’t know’ are uncertain, and correct CDU forecasts 
are treated as the reference category. While the proportion of inaccurate 
forecasts is similar between East and West Germans, 9.9% and 9.5% 
forecasted an SPD victory respectively, more than 15.7% of West Germans 
were uncertain about the election outcome compared to only 8.9% of East 
Germans.   
 To test how social networks predict the accuracy of election forecasts, 
we examine four network characteristics: network size, frequency of political 
discussion in the network, political expertise in the network, and network 
ideology (heterogeneity).  Network size ranges from 1 to 55, and is based on 
how many discussants the respondent named in the network battery6.  
                                                 
4 Question wording can be found in the appendix. 
5 We exclude respondents without a discussant because for them the other network characteristics 
cannot be calculated. 
6 Subsequent to the creation of this survey in 1990, there has been growingly scholarly discussion 
about network size generators.  Although Mardsen (2003) demonstrates that less than 10% of 
respondents generate more than 5 names, and Merluzzi and Bert (2013) provide evidence suggesting 
five is a cost effective number of network responses, Eveland, Hutchens, and Morey (2013) argue that 
the type of name generator used in this survey consistently underestimates network size.  Given our 
theoretical expectation, however, we argue that this underestimation provides a conservative test for 
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Frequency of political discussion measures how often, on average, the 
respondent discusses political matters with members of the network, based on 
respondent evaluation ranging from always to never (Network Discussion).  
Network expertise is based on the average evaluation of each network 
member’s level of political knowledge. Network ideology is measured as the 
proportion of the network that the respondent believes will vote for a left leaning 
party (Network Left), and the proportion of the network for whom the respondent 
does not know the political party preference (Network Unknown)7. Finally, 
network heterogeneity is operationalized as one minus the absolute difference 
between the proportions of left and right leaning members in the respondent’s 
network.8 While network size, frequency of discussion, network expertise, and 
network heterogeneity may be expected to improve the ability of the respondent 
to correctly forecast the outcome of the election, network ideology, particularly 
left-leaning networks, may decrease the likelihood of a correct election forecast 
– as suggested in the previous section. Table 2 displays summary statistics of 
the network variables. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Network Variables.   
 
West Germans  East Germans 
 
Average SD Min Max  Average SD Min Max 
Network Size 2.46 1.21 1 5  2.67 1.24 1 5 
Network Discussion  1.64 0.80 0 3  2.39 0.63 0 3 
Network Expertise 1.08 0.54 0 2  1.27 0.50 0 2 
Network Left (Proportion) 0.31 0.40 0 1  0.27 0.37 0 1 
Network Unknown (Proportion) 0.29 0.41 0 1  0.28 0.40 0 1 
Network Heterogeneity 0.42 0.43 0 1  0.43 0.43 0 1 
 
                                                 
our hypotheses. In addition, summary network measures cannot measure network characteristics 
besides size (Eveland, Hutchens, and Morey 2013). 
7 While there are some concerns of projection effects in using respondents’ evaluation of their 
discussion partner’s party preference, previous research has demonstrated that voters are surprisingly 
accurate in identifying their discussion partners’ political preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). 
8 The proportion of right leaning members is one minus the proportion of left leaning members and the 
proportion of members for whom the respondent does not know the political party 
preference.  Respondents with equal proportions of left and right leaning members in the network reach 
the highest value of one on the measure, indicating complete heterogeneity, while respondents with 
network members of only one ideological direction reach the lowest value of zero on this measure, 
indicating complete homogeneity. Respondents with an ideologically mixed network reach a value 
between these two extremes. 
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 In addition to these network effects, we consider other factors that 
previous studies suggest might predict the accuracy of the forecast (e.g., Lewis-
Beck and Tien 1999; Meffert et al. 2011): political, media, and demographic 
factors, as well as how many days before the election the survey interview took 
place. To capture individual partisanship and the effects of ‘wishful thinking’, we 
create three dummy variables based on the respondent’s reported vote 
intention on the second ballot, including SPD Voters, CDU Voters, and voters 
uncertain about how they will vote, with minor party supporters treated as the 
referent category.9  We also control for self-reported levels of political interest, 
attention to television news, and attention to news in newspapers. The 
sociodemographic measures we include are gender, age (transformed into four 
quartiles), and education (transformed into three categories).  Finally, since the 
survey was conducted over a number of weeks, we account for the number of 
days before the election that the respondent was surveyed. 
Because we argue that social networks provide citizens with information 
to forecast correctly, it is instructive to examine how our network measures 
differ from other measures related to information such as formal education, 
political interest, and media attention (TV and print).  To measure how network 
characteristics relate to these other informational measures, we calculated 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient r (Table 3). While there is an association 
between network characteristics and political education, interest, and media 
attention, it is very weak (|𝑟| < .20) or weak (. 20 ≤ |𝑟| < .40) most of the time.  
This means that while many people have personal characteristics (e.g., low 
political interest) that might make an accurate forecast less likely, they 
nevertheless have social network characteristics (e.g., many discussants) that 
might make an accurate forecast more likely. In other words, for many citizens 
their social network can potentially compensate for the lack of information from 
the media, while for others it can also correct or complement the media 
information they receive. The weak correlation between network characteristics 
                                                 
9 Germany uses a mixed member proportional electoral system, which provides voters with the 
opportunity to cast a candidate vote (first ballot) and party vote (second ballot) for the Bundestag, with 
the party vote determining the overall share of seats in the legislature.  This measure of vote intention 
creates the most comparable measure between East and West Germany, as partisanship was not asked of 
East German respondents. 
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and political interest, education, as well as media attention, together with our 
theoretical arguments, justifies considering network characteristics as 
additional predictors of forecasting accuracy.  
 
Table 3: Correlation between network characteristics and education, 
political interest, and media attention. 
  
Education 
Political 
Interest 
TV News 
Attention 
Print News 
Attention 
Network Size   0.20  0.18  0.12  0.12 
Network Frequency   0.33  0.46  0.43  0.31 
Network Expertise   0.22  0.34  0.28  0.24 
Network Left   0.01  0.09  0.03  0.04 
Network Unknown  -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 
Network Heterogeneity  -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 
The regression analyses reported below weight the respondents by inverse 
sampling probability in East and West, because East Germans where 
oversampled relative to their population proportion, and cluster the standard 
errors by sampling point. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Correct and incorrect forecasts 
First, we examine the variables that predict the accuracy of Germans’ 
election forecasts. The outcome in the logit model shown in Table 4 is whether 
the respondent correctly forecasted the CDU victory or not.  In this analysis, the 
incorrect forecasts include responses that the SPD would win as well as “don’t 
knows”.  While we are most interested in the difference in forecasting accuracy 
between respondents with different social network characteristics, looking at 
other variables that could predict forecast accuracy enables us to compare 
these results to the handful of other studies that have looked at the 
characteristics of accurate forecasters.  
The results of the binary logit model in Table 4 indicate that social 
networks predict forecast accuracy in ways consistent with our expectations, 
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even when controlling for a host of other political, media, and demographic 
characteristics.10  We observe that both the number of people in the 
respondent’s network and the frequency of political discussion have positive 
and statistically significant coefficients.  This means that both more people in 
the network and more frequent discussions in the network correspond to a 
positive difference in probability of a correct forecast.  Conversely, we observe 
that the share of the network with left or unknown political leanings have 
negative and statistical significant coefficients.  This means that the larger the 
share of the network with left or unknown political leanings, the less likely the 
respondent’s forecast will be correct.  The coefficients of both network expertise 
and network heterogeneity are in the expected positive direction, but miss 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 
Table 4: Correct Forecast of CDU victory 
Pooled Binary Logit Estimates 
Log-Odds 
 Estimate (Std. Error) 
Constant -0.89 (0.65) 
East -0.09 (0.19) 
Age 0.09 (0.06) 
Female -0.01 (0.13) 
Education 0.06 (0.13) 
Political Interest 0.29** (0.09) 
TV News Attention -0.03 (0.09) 
Print News Attention 0.03 (0.07) 
SPD Voter 0.03 (0.18) 
CDU Voter 2.10** (0.27) 
Undecided Voter 0.53** (0.25) 
Days Until Election -0.01 (0.01) 
Network Size 0.22** (0.07) 
Network Discussion 0.19* (0.11) 
Network Expertise 0.24 (0.16) 
                                                 
10 These and the following computations were performed on a Mac OS X 10.11.6 with 
Stata/SE 12 using the logit, mlogit, margins, and lincom commands. 
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Network Left -0.77** (0.24) 
Network Unknown -0.59* (0.35) 
Network Heterogeneity 0.15 (0.33) 
N 1547  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by sampling points. Data 
weighted by inverse sampling probabilities in East and West. 
 
Of the other variables, only a few coefficients attain statistical 
significance. We corroborate findings from earlier studies that respondents with 
higher levels of political interest are more likely to make an accurate forecast.  
And, we find evidence that CDU voters are more likely to correctly forecast a 
CDU victory relative to the excluded “minor party vote” category.  We also 
observe that respondents who say they don’t know whom they will vote for 
(undecided voters) are also more likely to correctly forecast compared to minor 
party voters, though the coefficient is smaller than for CDU voters.  By contrast, 
SPD voters are just as likely to get it right or wrong as minor party voters.  
Notably, the coefficient of the “East” variable, designed to capture 
systemic differences between East and West Germans in this pooled analysis, 
is not statistically significant.  Furthermore, the demographic variables, media 
exposure, and days before the election are not predictive of forecasting 
accuracy. 
To understand the results of the full binary model and the subsequent 
multinomial logit models we compute first differences (King 1989: 107f). First 
differences estimate how much the fitted values would differ on average when 
comparing two respondents that have different levels of a given predictor while 
being identical in all the other variables. We compute first differences by 
subtracting the expected probability of an outcome given the maximum value 
of a predictor from the expected probability given its minimum value, holding all 
other variables at their median. 
Figure 2 provides a visual assessment of the difference in the expected 
probabilities of a CDU forecast when comparing two respondents who have the 
minimum and maximum level of a predictor, while holding all the other variables 
at their medians. The bold line depicts the 90% confidence interval around the 
point estimate of the difference in expected probability, while the thinner and 
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slightly longer line shows the 95% confidence range.  Here, the predictive 
power of the social network variables is apparent, reinforcing the importance of 
the network characteristics.  Network size and the ideological leanings of the 
network show large differences in the expected probability of forecast accuracy, 
differences that are rivaled only by political interest and respondent vote 
intention for the CDU or not known.  For instance, if we compare a respondent 
who has five network members with someone who has one network member 
(the maximum and minimum values for network size), we expect to see that the 
respondent with the larger network has a 15 percentage point higher chance of 
making a correct forecast on average. As another example, if we compare a 
respondent whose network consists of only left leaning members with someone 
whose network consists of no left leaning members, we expect to see that the 
one with the more left leaning network has a 16 percentage point smaller 
chance of making a correct forecast on average. (Online Appendix Table A1 
provides the difference in expected probabilities and their confidence intervals 
that correspond to this figure.) 
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Figure 2: Difference in Expected Probabilities for Pooled Binary Logit 
Model 
Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals 
 
Note: Difference in expected probabilities between two respondents with 
maximum and minimum values of the predictor while holding the other 
predictors constant at their median value.  Predictors are sorted by 
increasing effect, separately for network characteristics and controls.  
Bold segments indicate 90% confidence intervals and thin segments 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Correct and incorrect forecasts and the “don’t knows” 
 
Next we recognize that “wrong” forecasts are not all the same.  A 
respondent could provide an incorrect forecast of an SPD victory, or the 
respondent could report not knowing who will win, and the covariates that 
predict these results are likely to be different. To assess this, we estimate 
multinomial logit models where those who offer an incorrect (SPD) or uncertain 
(don’t know) response are assessed relative to those who forecasted correctly.  
We estimate this for the pooled survey, and also in the form of an interactive 
model where we assess whether differences between East and West Germans 
exist when it comes to the coefficients of the various predictors.   
To understand the results of the multinomial logit model, we again 
compute first differences11.  Figure 3 presents the difference in expected 
probabilities and the corresponding confidence intervals for each predictor and 
for each forecast (CDU, SPD, don’t know) based on the estimates of the pooled 
multinomial logit model (Full results reported Table A2 in the online appendix).  
Here we observe that the social network variables differ in their predictive power 
across the three distinct forecasts.  In general, we observe that respondents 
who had a higher share of their network with left or unknown leanings and who 
have a network with lower levels of expertise were more likely to provide an 
incorrect SPD forecast.  By contrast, respondents who had less frequent 
discussions with those in their network were more likely to give a “don’t know” 
response.  Specifically, if we compare a respondent whose network has five 
members to someone whose network has one member, we expect that the 
respondent with the larger network is 14 percentage points more likely to make 
a correct CDU forecast, 11 percent less likely to give a “don’t know” response, 
and 2 percentage points less likely to make an incorrect SPD forecast.  In other 
words, we expect that respondents with varying network sizes differ in their 
chances of giving a CDU forecast or “don’t know” response, but that they are 
similar in their chances of giving a SPD forecast on average.  In sum, the larger 
the network, the more accurate and certain citizen forecasts are. (Online 
                                                 
11 Online Appendix Table A2 reports the full results of our pooled and interactive multinomial logit 
models. 
22 
 
 
Appendix Table A3 reports the differences in probabilities and the values for 
the 95% confidence intervals).   
 
Figure 3: Difference in Expected Probabilities for the Pooled Multinomial 
Logit Model 
Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals 
 
Note: Difference in expected probabilities of a CDU, Don’t know, or SPD 
forecast between two respondents with maximum and minimum values 
of the predictor while holding the other variables constant at their median 
value. Predictors are sorted by increasing effect on giving a CDU 
response, separately for network characteristics and controls.  Bold 
segments indicate 90% confidence intervals and thin segments indicate 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3 also shows large differences in expected probabilities for 
respondents who differ in their vote intention and political interest.  Comparing 
two respondents with high and low political interest, we expect that the one who 
is more interested in politics has a 27 percentage points higher chance of 
correctly forecasting the CDU to win, a 27 percentage points lower chance of a 
“don’t know” response, but does not differ in the probability of an incorrect SPD 
forecast on average.12 
 So far, in the binary and multinomial logit models and in the difference 
in expected probability figures, we have demonstrated that social network 
characteristics are highly predictive of the accuracy of an election forecast, and 
they help us distinguish between incorrect forecasts and respondent 
uncertainty.  These network measures, in addition to political interest and vote 
intentions, by far outperform demographics and media variables.  The number 
of days before the election that the interview took place is not predictive of the 
type of prediction given by the respondent.  
 
Allowing the coefficients to vary between East and West Germans 
 
German reunification ended 40 years of political division between East 
and West Germany. It has been of general interest to describe the similarities 
and differences in public opinion and behavior between East and West 
Germans in order to understand the extent to which the country has developed 
a unified political culture (e.g., Gabriel 1997; van Deth, Rattinger, and Roller 
2000; Fuchs, Roller, and Wessels 2002; Gabriel, Falter, and Rattinger 2005; 
Falter et al. 2006). In our context, we expect East Germans to rely more on 
social network information than West Germans given the challenges that new 
democracies are likely to be subjected to, such as weak partisan cues, low 
levels of partisan identification, and volatile voters (Baker, Ames and Renho 
                                                 
12 While we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the first difference for political interest is the same 
for network size related to a CDU response (b=0.13; Std. Err.=0.09; z=1.54) and a SPD response 
(b=0.04, Std. Err.=0.03; z=1.34), we can reject the null hypothesis for a Don't Know response (b=-0.17; 
Std. Err.=0.08; z=-1.98). 
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2006). Hence, now we examine whether the coefficients of our predictors differ 
in the East and West. 
To examine possible heterogeneous coefficients between East and 
West, we follow the recommendations of Tsai and Gill (2013) on interactions in 
generalized linear models. We first add to the pooled multinomial logit 
regression equation product terms between each of the predictors and the East 
dummy variable. (The last two columns of Table A2 display the estimates of 
this interacted multinomial logit model.) We then calculate first differences of 
the predictors, separately for East and West. And, finally, we compare the first 
differences of a predictor across East and West to assess the statistical 
significance and magnitude of the interaction. (Online Appendix Figure A1 and 
Table A4 show all of these first differences.)  
By following this procedure, we found statistically significant interactions 
for only two network variables (the size of the network and the share of the 
network with left political leanings) on just one outcome (“don't know”).  In other 
words, of the 18 possible interactions – six network variables multiplied by three 
outcomes – 16 are statistically insignificant. Because with 20 such comparisons 
we would expect 1 of them to be statistically significant by chance, we do not 
want to emphasize the differences that we found. The results of the interacted 
model suggest, therefore, that there are no major differences in how network 
characteristics predict forecast accuracy between East and West Germans. For 
both groups social networks predict forecast accuracy in the same way.13 
 
A SIMPLE NETWORK MEASURE FOR IMPROVING ACCURACY OF OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
PREDICTIONS 
 
The above analysis described which citizens were more likely than 
others to correctly forecast the election.  Next, we would like to provide 
                                                 
13 We also considered possible interactions between the most important predictors (Gelman and Hill 
2007: 69): network size, network discussion, and network left as well as political interest and vote 
intention.  We tested whether the network variables interact with each other, and whether they 
interact with the other predictors following again the procedure recommended by Tsai and Gill 
(2013).    (In the online appendix, Tables A5, A6 and A8 show the estimated regression models while 
the Tables A7 and A9 as well as Figures A2 to A6 show the first differences.)  We found one 
statistically significant interaction: the importance of the frequency of discussion decreases with 
higher levels of political interest for the outcomes CDU and Don't Know. 
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guidance for people who want to use citizen forecasts to forecast future election 
outcomes.  As mentioned before, aggregated citizen forecasts are most 
accurate when weighting individual forecasters by their forecasting 
competence.  The above analysis improves the researcher's ability to identify 
which individuals to weight more heavily: because social network 
characteristics predict forecasting competence, future aggregated citizen 
forecasts will be more accurate when they use these network characteristics to 
calculate the individual weights. 
However, network batteries take a great deal of space on a 
questionnaire.  The survey we used in our analysis included five questions 
identifying network members plus follow-up items for each identified member 
measuring their political preference, expertise, frequency of discussion, etc.  Is 
including network batteries in new surveys worth it in terms of improving 
election forecasting accuracy?  Below, we show that even a single, abbreviated 
measure of network size – asking citizens with how many people they 
discussed an important personal matter – improves out-of-sample predictions. 
We compared the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of all possible 
subsets of the predictors considered above, with three modifications.  First, as 
the response variable, we chose whether the citizen correctly forecasted the 
winner (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”).  We excluded the response “don't know” because 
only actual forecasts can be weighted.  Second, as the only network 
characteristic, we considered network size (0 = “no discussants” to 5 = “five 
discussants”).  We do so because the above descriptive analysis found that it 
strongly correlated with forecasting accuracy, and because this predictor also 
applies to citizens without a discussant, while the other network characteristics 
apply only to citizens with at least one discussant.  (Excluding “don't knows” 
and including citizens without networks changes the number of observations to 
1,592.)  Finally, we replaced the three vote intention predictors with a single 
dummy variable indicating whether citizens forecasted the same party to win 
as the one they intend to vote for (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”).  We do so because this 
predictor can be used without the researcher knowing in advance which party 
will win (Murr 2015).  This leaves us with ten predictors: East, Age, Female, 
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Education, Political Interest, TV News Attention, Print News Attention, Forecast 
Intention, Days Until Election, and Network Size. 
We used k-fold cross-validation (e.g., Ward 2010, Murr 2015) to 
compare the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of all 2^10=1,024 possible 
subsets of predictors.  Cross-validation randomly splits the data into k folds.  It 
first fits the models to the k-1 folds and then tests them on the k-th one, iterating 
these two steps from 1 to k to get a distribution of the predictive accuracy.  We 
set k = 10, which is the typical value in the literature, and repeated k-fold cross-
validation with ten different splits.  We measured the predictive accuracy with 
the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (AUROC), which is a 
common measure of accuracy in the forecasting literature for binary 
classification tasks (e.g., Ward 2010, Murr 2015).  An AUROC value of 50 per 
cent indicates a random classifier and a value of 100 per cent indicates an 
optimal classifier.  The AUROC can be interpreted as the probability that a 
randomly chosen correct citizen forecaster is ranked as more likely to be correct 
than a randomly chosen incorrect citizen forecaster (Fawcett 2007). 
Including network size as a predictor improved the predictive accuracy 
(Table 5).  Overall, the model with the largest AUROC of 62.57 per cent 
included only five of the nine predictors: Age, TV News Attention, Forecast 
Intention, Days Until Election, and Network Size.  By contrast, the best model 
excluding network size achieved an AUROC of 61.40 per cent – 1.17 
percentage points lower compared to the best model including network size.  
Averaging across all 1,024 models, the AUROC of models including network 
size was 1.4 percentage points larger than the AUROC of models excluding 
network size.  By comparison, only Forecast Intention and Age had a larger 
increase of 3.98 and 3.22 percentage points, respectively.  Including some 
predictors even decreased predictive accuracy on average.  For instance, the 
AUROC of models including Print News Attention was on average 0.17 
percentage points lower than the AUROC of models excluding Print News 
Attention.  This all demonstrates that it is worth including network size as a 
measure on a new survey because it does a better job predicting forecasting 
competence than many commonly available measures (e.g., print news 
attention).  And as elections grow increasingly competitive and election results 
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grow tighter, even minor improvements on forecasting measurements may play 
a critical role in increasing forecast accuracy. 
 
Table 5: Out-of-sample accuracy of all possible 1,024 subsets of 
variables in predicting correct forecasts (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”) of 1,592 
citizens before the German Bundestag election in 1990 using binary 
logistic regression. 
 Predictors (0 = “excluded”; 1 = “included”)  
Ran
k 
Eas
t 
Ag
e 
Fem
. 
Educ
. 
Pol
. 
Int. 
T
V  
Prin
t 
Forec
. 
Intent
. 
Day
s 
Net. 
Siz
e 
AUCO
C 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 62.57 
2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 62.48 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 62.36 
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 62.32 
5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 62.28 
6 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 62.27 
7 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 62.21 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 62.19 
9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 62.18 
10 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 62.18 
…            
91 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 61.40 
…            
 
Note: Entries are sorted by decreasing average area under the receiver 
operator characteristic curve (AUROC) in 10-fold cross-validation across 
ten repetitions and by decreasing number of predictors. Due to space 
constraints, only the ten best models are presented, as well as the best 
model without network size as a predictor. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, we have examined how social networks predict the ability 
of citizens to correctly forecast the election winner when controlling for other 
variables such as political interest, gender, education, media attention, and vote 
intention.  Specifically, we have found that citizens with larger social networks 
and who engage in more frequent political discussion are better at forecasting 
the winner than people who do not share these network characteristics. Our 
analysis also shows that the political leanings of the network matter. Those 
whose network is composed of a higher proportion of left-wing party supporters 
were less likely to correctly forecast that the right-wing CDU would win.  
Furthermore, respondents who were unsure of their friends’ party preferences 
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were less likely to provide a correct forecast.  Essentially, those voters with an 
extensive, communicative, and varied group of friends – and, of course, 
neighbors, colleagues, family members, and peers – are best able to accurately 
forecast the election winner.   
Finding such robust results for social network characteristics might be a 
surprise in this particular election when, at the time of the survey in autumn 
1990, public opinion polls pointed to a decisive CDU victory. We view this 
particular election as a conservative test of our social networks theory. With the 
election all but a forgone conclusion, one might expect the social network’s 
predictive power of the respondents’ forecasts to be limited.  Yet even in this 
context, networks demonstrably predicted citizens’ forecasts.  In more 
competitive elections, where there is greater uncertainty about the likely winner, 
social networks and their characteristics would likely play an even more 
important role in predicting voters’ election forecasts. 
In addition to examining the predictive power of social network 
characteristics on election forecasts, we have also considered how experience 
with democratic elections might predict citizens’ ability to give an accurate 
forecast, based on whether respondents resided in East or West Germany.  
Perhaps surprisingly, East Germans were more likely to correctly forecast the 
victor than West Germans.  And, while we might have expected that less 
democratic experience would mean that networks were more important for East 
than for West Germans in predicting their expectations – given the challenges 
faced by new democracies (e.g. weak partisan cues, low levels of partisan 
identification and volatile voters as discussed by Baker, Ames and Renho 
2006), our analysis indicates that such differences do not exist.  
 The robustness of our findings in both East and West Germany suggests 
that the predictive power of social networks should appear in both new and 
established democracies. However, since the institutional and political context 
of the 1990 German election is the same for both regions, future research 
should examine whether social networks predict citizen forecasts similarly in 
countries with different party systems and electoral rules.    
Future research could study how the internet and the emergence of 
online social networks have influenced citizens’ ability to forecast.  Some 
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studies have shown that the internet has neither increased nor decreased 
social capital, but supplemented it (e.g., Wellmann et al. 2001).  Hence, citizens 
seem to bond (form closer connections with others) and bridge (form ties across 
social groups) to the same extent as before.  Other studies have shown a high 
overlap of offline and online social networks (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al. 2008), 
hence, elicited networks using electoral surveys are likely to be a subset of the 
networks captured in online social networks.  Online platforms are likely to 
increase citizens’ ability to forecast because they provide wider access to 
information without additional cost. They enable citizens to be updated about 
their networks’ electoral preferences without face-to-face discussions, and they 
allow citizens to be informed about all their network members, even those who 
are distant from the most influential people in their network.  
A final lesson of our analysis is that social network characteristics, and 
questions on citizen forecasting are important elements in electoral surveys, 
and that their exclusion may inhibit our understanding of political learning and 
decision making. Social network size and composition are associated with the 
ability of citizens to correctly forecast elections, and as the demand for political 
forecasting continues, understanding how and why citizens correctly estimate 
the winners of elections is critical.  Absent measures of social network 
characteristics, we cannot fully predict and utilize these forecasts.  Additionally, 
understanding citizen forecasting reveals something important about how 
social networks predict political learning. Size and ideological make-up of 
networks compete with other factors to predict whether citizens can make 
correct inferences about not just local, but also national, political trends.  In 
sum, just as social networks help us understand citizen forecasting, citizen 
forecasting informs us about how social networks predict contextual learning 
and political knowledge.   
30 
 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
Ahn, T. K., Robert Huckfeldt, and John Barry Ryan. 2014. Experts, Activists, 
and Democratic Politics: Are Electorates Self-Educating? Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baker, A., Ames, B. and Renno, L.R., 2006. Social context and campaign 
volatility in new democracies: networks and neighborhoods in Brazil's 
2002 elections. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), pp.382-
399.  
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Drew Fudenberg.  2004. “Word-of-mouth 
Learning.” Games and Economic Behavior 46(1): 1-22. 
Blais, A. and Bodet, M.A., 2006. How do voters form expectations about the 
parties' chances of winning the election?. Social Science 
Quarterly, 87(3), pp.477-493. 
Campbell, James E. 2016. "The Trial-heat and the Seats-in-trouble Forecasts 
of the 2016 Presidential and congressional Elections." PS: Political 
Science & Politics 49: 664-68. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2009. “Why Voters in Patronage Democracies Split Their 
Tickets: Strategic Voting for Ethnic Parties.” Electoral Studies 28(1): 21–
32. 
Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de. 1785. Essai 
Sur L’application de L’analyse a La Probabilité Des Descisions Redues 
a La Pluralité de Voix. Paris: De l’Imprimerie Royale. 
van Deth, Jan, Hans Rattinger, and Edeltraud Roller (eds.). 2000. Die Republik 
auf dem Weg zur Normalität? Wahlverhalten und politische 
Einstellungen nach acht Jahren Einheit. Opladen: Leske + Budrich . 
Entman, Robert M. 1989. "How the Media Affect What People Think: An 
information processing approach." The Journal of Politics 51: 347-370. 
Erikson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. 2016. "Forecasting the 
Presidential Vote with Leading Economic Indicators and the Polls." PS: 
Political Science & Politics 46: 669-72. 
31 
 
 
Eveland, William P. 2004. “The Effect of Political Discussion in Producing 
Informed Citizens: The Roles of Information, Motivation, and 
Elaboration.” Political Communication 21(2): 177–93. 
Eveland, William P, and Myiah Hutchens Hively. 2009. “Political Discussion 
Frequency, Network Size, and ‘Heterogeneity’ of Discussion as 
Predictors of Political Knowledge and Participation.” Journal of 
Communication 59(2): 205–24. 
Eveland, Jr, William P., Myiah J. Hutchens, and Alyssa C. Morey. 2013. 
"Political Network Size and Its Antecedents and Consequences." 
Political Communication 30(3): 371-94. 
Falter, Jürgen W., Oscar Gabriel, Hans Rattinger, and Harald Schoen (eds.). 
2006. Sind wir ein Volk? Ost- und Westdeutschland im Vergleich. 
Munich: Beck. 
Fawcett, Tom. 2006. “An Introduction to ROC Analysis.” Pattern Recognition 
Letters 27(8): 861–874. 
Finkel, Steven E., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Civic Education, Political 
Discussion, and the Social Transmission of Democratic Knowledge and 
Values in a New Democracy: Kenya 2002.” American Journal of Political 
Science 55(2): 417–35. 
Ford, Robert, Will Jennings, Mark Pickup, and Christopher Wlezien. 2016. 
“From Polls to Votes to Seats: Forecasting the 2015 British General 
Election” Electoral Studies 41: 244-49. 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim. 2017. Partial Cumulation of 
Politbarometers 1977-2015. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2391 
Data file Version 7.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12733 
Fuchs, Dieter, Edeltraud Roller, and Bernhard Wessels (eds.). 2002. Bürger 
und Demokratie in Ost und West: Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum 
politischen Prozess. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Gabriel, Oscar W. (ed.). 1997. Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen 
im vereinigten Deutschland. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Gabriel, Oscar W., Jürgen W. Falter, and Hans Rattinger (eds.). 2005. Wächst 
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QUESTION WORDING APPENDIX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
FORECASTING:  
From the present point of view: who would you say will win the next general 
election: The CDU/CSU or a coalition government led by CDU/CSU, or the 
SDP or a coalition government led by the SDP? 
NETWORK VARIABLES 
NETWORK SIZE  
From time to time, most people discuss important personal matters with other 
people.  Looking back over the last six months, who are the people with whom 
you discussed an important personal matter? 
NETWORK FREQUENCY 
When you talk with these persons, how often do you discuss political 
questions?  Would you say almost always, sometimes, seldom, or never? 
NETWORK EXPERTISE 
How much do these persons, in your opinion, know about politics: much or 
very much, average, less much? Would you say: much/very much, average, 
or less much?  
NETWORK IDEOLOGY 
Which party do you think would these persons vote for in the general election 
of 2 December this year? 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
VOTE CHOICE:  
Second Vote: Which party will you vote for with your second vote? 
POLITICAL INTEREST 
Generally Speaking: How much are you interested in politics? Would you say: 
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very much, much, so-so, somewhat, or not at all? 
TV NEWS ATTENTION 
How attentively do you follow [television] news reports on political events in 
Germany and other countries?  Would you say: very attentively, attentively, 
less attentively, or not attentively at all? 
PRINT NEWS ATTENTION 
Regardless of how often you read your daily newspaper: How attentively do 
you read the reports on the political events in Germany and other countries? 
Would you say: very attentively, attentively, less attentively, or not attentively 
at all? 
EDUCATION 
What education level do you have? 
AGE 
Please tell me what month and year you were born 
GENDER 
Sex of Respondent: Man or Woman. 
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